

自 年 月 日
 至 年 月 日

日米外交関係雑纂
 太平洋平和並東亞問題ニ関スル日米交渉関係
 特殊情報綴

第 卷

記 録
 至 年 月 日
 日本外交関係雑纂 太平洋平和並東亞問題ニ関スル日米交渉関係
 特殊情報綴

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1
3
1
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REEL No. A-0300

0300

アジア歴史資料センター

外機密

- 2 -

(2) When the Japanese Ambassador had arrived here two or three months ago, he had opened the question of the possibility of reaching some agreement with the United States Government and of settling the China war on one quarter (? terms) that seemed on paper not unreasonable: independence of China — withdrawal of Japanese armies — no discrimination. He claimed that he spoke with the assent of the heads of the Navy and the Army, and could get support of the Emperor and the rest of the Cabinet, apart from Matsuoka. General feeling, according to him, among those who felt this way was that Matsuoka's policy had brought them little good and promised them a great deal of ragged (? possible) trouble for binding (? no) simplest (? clear) advantage.

外務

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2

外機密

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22/5/41 SA

Japanese Peace Overture

(In figure cipher)

From Halifax, Washington

To Eden, London

May 18th, 3.30 a.m., 1941

Summary:

The Japanese Ambassador approached Hull with terms for the settlement of the China Affair — terms approved by the Japanese Navy and Army and the entire Cabinet except the Foreign Minister. Willkie has been asked to visit Japan by an American business man who can speak for the Japanese Cabinet except the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister's recent letter to Brew is "a letter of a man on the edge of a nervous breakdown".

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2221, May 17th, and repeated to Tokyo. Your despatch No. 62.

(1) Mr. Hull spoke to me yesterday about some informal conversations that he had been having with the Japanese Ambassador. He was under the mistaken impression that he had told me of these earlier.

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

1

外機密

- 4 -

at open war with the Axis. If anything at all came of it, ^{of} which Hull was not sanguine, he would naturally wish at later stage to talk with the Chinese, when it (? then) ourselves and the Dutch.

Through sumu (? I) told Hull that I thought that the danger to be avoided was any action that might be plausibly represented in Japan as a successful attempt on the part of Japanese to divide the United States and ourselves. Has informed me (? I told him) that, provided the United States Government were fully alive to this danger and guarded against it, and if there was any chance at all of any bear (? good) really coming out of this on terms satisfactory to us all, I had no doubt that you would welcome it. Hull said that he was fully alive to the importance of what I had said as to possible danger, and felt certain that that would be your attitude.

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外務省

4

外機密

RY

- 3 -

(3) Hull had told him that he had better see what he could do with the cabinet and the Emperor, and that at some later date the Japanese Ambassador had come back, hot (? saying that) the support he had hoped to be able to enlist was in do you see any objection (? Japan) forthcoming.

(4) Hull said that he did not take all this too seriously, but thought that, if there were one chance in twenty-five of being able to get an understanding with Japan that we all could accept, it would be wrong to miss it. He accordingly proposed to listen to anything more that the Ambassador might have to say, and to ask him one or two fundamental questions about Japanese policy, such as their intentions towards the south and their attitude towards any general effort to keep war out of the Pacific Ocean.

(5) Hull had gathered from the Ambassador that those in favour of this movement in Japan had thought that it was better to begin with the United States rather than with ourselves, who were

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外務省

3

外機密

- 6 -

(6) The Australian Minister told Willkie that in his opinion the approach appeared to indicate a considerable difference of opinion in the highest Japanese circles. Even if the eventual results of a visit were nil, the fact of it having been made might delay Japan's plan for southern advance and might strengthen the hands of moderate elements. At the same time, it would be important to guard against the danger of the visit being interpreted as an attempt to appease Japan.

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外務省

6

外機密

- 5 -

(7) Yesterday the Australian Minister told me that Willkie had told him that he had been approached with the suggestion that he should visit Japan. This suggestion came from a well-known American businessman, who said that he represented large Japanese interests and was also able to speak unofficially for all the Japanese Cabinet except the Minister for Foreign Affairs. These people believe it possible for Japan and the United States to arrive at an understanding to enable war to be avoided. The present relations between the two Governments made a direct approach difficult. If Willkie agreed, he would be formally invited by the Japanese Ambassador in the name of the Prime Minister. Willkie felt that he could not do correctly unless he was sure that the proposal was agreeable to the Administration, but did not like to approach the latter himself and asked the Australian Minister to mention the matter to Hull. The Australian Minister did so in a letter on May 15th.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

5

外機密

EN

- 8 -

had formed the conclusion in the last few weeks that the Japanese were thinking twice and better of embarking on a policy of adventure leading to war, and was convinced by his personal unsatisfactory (? observation) of the extremely difficult economic position at present prevailing in Japan.

Halifax.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

8

外機密

EN

- 7 -

(9) Welles told me this morning that he was inclined to attach rather more importance to this talk of the Japanese Ambassador than he would have a short time ago. He showed me a telegram from the United States Ambassador in Tokyo reporting a private letter from Matsuoka, which contained nothing very definite but was mainly wild language about the importance of avoiding war in the Pacific Ocean, etc. . Welles thought that it was a letter of a man on the edge of a nervous breakdown, and said he heard that Matsuoka was drinking too much. Anyhow they would very soon know if there was anything in it, because they had put some questions, your proposal (? of which) he did not tell me of the exact nature but which he said were pretty this time, ... Ambassador, and on receipt of replies, they would be able to judge whether there is anything to be made of it or not. He will keep me informed.

(10) I saw discourteous Mr. Tobowick question whether late wanted (?) Shanghai and this Council. Spirits (?) through view was worth, he said that he

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

7

外機密

- 2 -

ese-American relations and his apparent lack of interest in all that concerned Anglo-Japanese relations. While genuinely opposed to Japan's involvement in a major war and to any policy of adventure, Admiral Nomura was and presumably still is an apostle of the doctrine that a wedge can be driven between the United States and ourselves.

(2) May I add that I am in full agreement with the masterly review of the situation contained in your telegram?

Craigie.

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外務省

10

外機密

27/5/41

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Ambassador Nomura's Guiding Principle

(In figure cipher)

From Craigie, Tokyo

To Eden, London

May 24th, 4 p.m., 1941

Summary:

The Admiral, while Foreign Minister, has consistently worked to better Japan's relations with America, but has shown little interest in Japanese-British relations. He believes in driving a wedge between America and Britain.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 865, May 24th, Washington telegram No. 148, Shanghai telegram No. 84; please repeat to Chungking telegram No. 84, "Ambition" Singapore telegram No. 239. Your telegram No. 27 to Washington, paragraph 5, (a).

It may be pertinent to recall that, during Admiral Nomura's incumbency of the office of Foreign Minister, I was impressed by his singleness of purpose in working for an improvement in Japan-

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

9

外機密

- 2 -

after consultation with the Australian Minister and myself, sent a telegram to London, which may be said to represent our joint views on this matter. The relevant part follows: "The idea that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington should conduct negotiations of this importance without knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is remarkable even for Japan, though not impossible. The State Department are right in proceeding with great caution, because of the danger that, once Japan's hands are freed in China, an even more aggressive policy may be adopted vis-à-vis the United States and ourselves, notwithstanding any assurances to the contrary given by Admiral Nomura. No guarantee against this happening could in my opinion be adequate so long as Matsuoka remains in power with his present pro-axis ... (? sympathies). Moreover, the whole trend of official opinion and the opinion which finds public expression is so strongly opposed to any settlement of the

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

外機密

2/6/41 Y

Nomura-Hull Conversations
Recent Telegrams Repeated to Ottawa

(In figure cipher)

From Canadian Chargé, Tokyo
To Minister for External Affairs,
Ottawa

May 30th, 1.20 p.m., 1941

Your Secret telegram No. 67, May 27th.

- (1). In recent conversations with the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador mentioned the following points as a basis for the settlement of the China incident (a) withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, (b) guarantee of the independence of China, and (c) no discrimination against third Powers in China.
- (2). Admiral Nomura claims to have the backing of the Army and Navy leaders and in addition that of the Emperor himself.
- (3). On May 23rd, Sir Robert Craigie,

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外務省

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外機密

4/6/41 M

Foreign Minister: Washington
Conversations: Threatened Assassination
(In figure cipher)

From Canadian Chargé d'Affaires, Tokyo
To Minister for External Affairs, Ottawa
May 31st, 0.15 p.m., 1941.

May 31st, No. 89. Secret.

(It is) highly important (that) my telegram
No. 85, May 30th, be kept strictly confidential.

The latest public statement of Matsuoka
indicates that he may have got wind of the
Washington conversations and is endeavouring to
strengthen his position. It is a fact that the
Black Dragon Society has threatened to assassinate
him, should he embroil Japan with the United States.

外
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本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

14

外機密

- 3 -

kind outlined by Admiral Nomura, particularly
under any foreign auspices, that I cannot help
suspecting a trap."

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外
務
省

13

本情報ヲ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

(新暗)

六月二日

伯林發

(第六四號)

外交部長宛

駐獨大使

日米妥協ノ風説ニ關スル件

拙電六十一號御査閱ノ事ト存ニ官邊ヨリ駭カニ傳聞セシ處ナル

カ日米妥協ノ條件ハ

- (一) 日米ハ自發的ニ歐戰ニ參加セズ
- (二) 米國ハ日支ヲ調停ス
- (三) 日米ハ新條約ヲ締結シ極東及南洋ニ於テ經濟合作ヲ爲ス
- (四) 米國ハ南京政府ヲ承認ス(附帶條件トシテ日ハ米ノ對支借款ヲ承認シ米ハ日本ノ極東ニ於ケル特殊地位ヲ承認スル) 以上

外機密

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2

右ハ米國ノ提案ニ係ルモノニシテ野村大使之ヲ折衝ニ當リ松岡ノ支持シ居レリトノ事ナリ日本軍ノ支那撤退ニ關シテハ日本ノ實業界並ニ海軍ハ均シク之ニ贊成ナルモ陸軍ノ一部ハ反對シ公明一派ハ右ニ就キテ獨方ヲ説得シ得サルモノト爲シ居リ米國ハ太平洋ノ軍備ヲ減シテ全力ヲ以テ英國ヲ援助シ極東及南洋ニ於テ日米經濟合作ヲ爲スニ在リ然アレハ即チ所謂三國同盟並ニ大東亞新秩序ノ如何ニ拘ラス日本ハ有利ニ日支間ノ問題ヲ解決シ且日米通商ヲ恢復シ得テ經濟上ノ合作ニ從事シ得ベシトノ事ナリ「ルーズベルト」ノ遺囑斷ヲ目シテ右ハ未ダ宣戰ニハ言及シ居ササルカ既ニ事實上ノ敵對行爲ヲ爲スモノト爲シ日本ノ斯ナル

15

外機密

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

態度ヲ痛ク憂ヒ居レリ但シ獨ハ之ヲ阻止スルノ術ナクト一駐
日本大使ハ松岡ノ親米政策ヲ頗ル苦慮シ歸國ヲ決シ居レリトノ事
ナリ

外務省

外機密

米側對案（六月二十一日在米大使取次）

（嚴秘）（非公式、試案ニシテ拘束力ナシ）

合衆國及日本國政府ハ傳統的友好關係恢復ノ爲共同宣言ニ於テ表
現セラルルカ如キ了解ニ關スル一般的協定ノ交渉開始及締結ノ爲
共同ノ責任ヲ受諾ス

兩國國交ノ最近ノ疎隔ノ特定原因ニ論及スルコトナク兩國間友好
的感情惡化ノ原因トナレル事件ノ再發ヲ防止シ且其ノ不測不幸ナ
ル結果ニ付矯正ヲ圖ルコトハ兩國政府ノ衷心ヨリノ希望ナリ

共同ノ努力ニ依リ合衆國及日本國カ太平洋ニ於ケル平和ノ樹立及
保持ノタメ有效ナル貢獻ヲ爲スコト及友好的了解ヲ速ニ完成スル

電信寫

コトニ依リ、世界平和ヲ助長シ且現ニ文明ヲ沒滅セントスル傾
ル悲シムヘキ混亂ヲ假令一掃セシムルコト不可能ナリトスルモ之
カ惡化ヲ抑制センコトハ兩國政府ノ眞摯ナル希望ナリ

斯カル果斷ナル措置ノ爲ニハ長期ノ交渉ハ不適當ニシテ又效果薄
弱ナリ、仍テ兩國政府ハ兩國政府ヲ不取敢道義的ニ且其ノ行動ニ
關シ拘束スヘキ一般的了解ヲ成立セシメ之ヲ完成スル爲ニハ適當
ノ手段ヲ案出實施スルコトヲ希望ス

兩國政府ハ斯ル了解ニハ緊急ヲ要スル樞要問題ノミヲ包含セシメ
後日會議ノ審議ニ譲リ得ヘキ附隨的事項ハ之ヲ含マシメサルコト
然ルヘシト信ス

兩國政府ハ左ノ如キ特定ノ事態及態度ヲ明瞭ニシ又ハ改善スルニ

外機密

電信寫

於テハ融和關係ノ達成ヲ期待シ得ヘント認ム

一 國際關係及國家ノ本質ニ關スル合衆國及日本國ノ觀念

二 歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府ノ態度

三 日支間ノ和平解決ニ對スル措置

四 兩國間ノ通商

五 太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩國ノ經濟的活動

六 太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ關スル兩國政府ノ方針

七 比律賓群島ノ中立化

因テ合衆國政府及日本國政府ハ茲ニ左ノ相互的了解及政策ノ宣言ニ到達セリ

一 國際關係及國家ノ本質ニ關スル合衆國及日本國ノ觀念

兩國政府ハ其ノ國策ハ永續的の平和ノ樹立竝ニ兩國民間ノ相互信頼及協力ノ新時代ノ創始ヲ目的トスルモノナルコトヲ確認ス

兩國政府ハ各國家及各民族カ正義及衡平ニ依ル萬邦協和ノ理想ノ下ニ生存スル一字ヲ爲ストハ其ノ傳統的的及現在ニ於ケル觀念及確信ナルコトヲ聲明ス即チ平和的の手續ニ依リ規律セラレ且精神的及物質的の福祉ノ追求ヲ目的トスル相關の利害關係ニ基キ何レモ等シク權利ヲ享有シ責任ヲ容認ス而シテ右福祉タルヤ各國家及民族カ他ノ爲ニ之ヲ毀損スヘカラサルカ如ク自ラノ爲ニ之ヲ擁護スモノトス更ニ兩國政府ハ他ノ民族ノ抑壓又ハ擄取ヲ排撃スヘキ各自ノ責任ヲ容認ス

兩國政府ハ國家ノ本質ニ關スル各自ノ傳統的の觀念竝ニ社會的の秩序

外機密

及國家生活ニ關スル基礎的の道義的の原則ハ引續キ之ヲ保存スヘク且右道義的の原則及觀念ニ反スル外來ノ思想又ハ「イデオロギ」ニ依リ變改セシメサルコトヲ固ク決意ス

三、歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府ノ態度

日本國政府ハ三國條約ノ目的カ過去ニ於テモ又現在ニ於テモ防禦的ニシテ挑發ニ依ラサル歐洲戰爭ノ擴大防止ニ寄與セントスルモノナルコトヲ闡明ス

合衆國政府ハ其ノ歐洲戰爭ニ對スル態度ハ現在及今後モ防護ト自衛即チ自國ノ安全ト之カ防衛ノ考慮ニ依リテノミ決セラルヘキモノナルコトヲ闡明ス

電信寫

本試案ノ取
次ハ在米大
使之ヲ拒否
セルヲ以テ
註ノミヲ存
ス

註、(一九四一年五月三十一日案ノ一部ヲ成セル本問題ニ關スル

合衆國政府ノ附屬追加聲明ノ代リトシテ茲ニ交換公文ノ試案

添付セラル)

三、日支間ノ和平解決ニ對スル措置

日本國政府ハ合衆國政府ニ對シ日本國政府カ支那國政府トノ和平解決交渉ヲ提議スヘキ場合ニ於ケル基礎的の一般條件即チ日本國政府ノ聲明スルトコロニ依レハ善隣友好、主權及領土ノ相互尊重ニ關スル近衛原則並ニ右原則ノ實際的の適用ニ矛盾セサルモノナル條件ヲ闡報シタルヲ以テ合衆國大統領ハ支那國政府及日本國政府カ相互ニ有利ニシテ且受諾シ得ヘキ基礎ニ於テ戰鬪行爲ノ終結及平和

關係ノ恢復ノタメ交渉ニ入ル様支那國政府ニ懇湊スヘシ

注、(第三項ノ前記案文ハ共產運動ニ對スル共同防衛問題(支那領土ニ於ケル日本軍隊ノ駐屯問題ヲ含ム)及日支間ノ經濟的協力ノ問題ニ關スル今後ノ討議ニ依リ變更セララルコトアルヘシ、第三項ノ案文修正ノ提議ニ關シテハ如何ナル修正提案モ本項ニ關シ附屬書ニ掲ケラレタル一切ノ點カ満足ニ起草セラレ本項及附屬書カ全體トシテ検討シ得ルニ至リタル上ニテ考究スルコト最モ好都合ナリト信ス)

四 兩國間ノ通商

本了解カ兩國政府ニ依リ公式ニ承認セラレタルトキハ合衆國及

日本國ハ兩國ノ一方カ供給シ得テ他方カ必要トスルカ如キ物資ヲ相互ニ供給スヘキコトヲ保障スヘシ兩國政府ハ更ニ管テ日米通商航海條約ニ基キ確立セラレ居タルカ如キ正常ノ通商關係ヲ恢復セシムルニ必要ナル措置ヲ講スルコトニ同意ス、若シ新通商條約カ兩國政府ニ依リ希望セラレルトキハ右ハ出來得ル限り速カニ交渉セラレヘク且通常ノ手續ニ從ヒ締結セラレヘシ

五 太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩國ノ經濟的活動

太平洋方面ニ於ケル日本國及米國ノ活動ハ平和的手段ニ依リ且國際通商關係ニ於ケル無差別待遇ノ原則ニ遵ヒ行ハルヘシトノ茲ニ爲サレタル相互的審約ニ基キ日本國政府及合衆國政府ハ兩國カ夫々自國經濟ノ保全及發達ノタメ必與トスル天然資源(例

外機密

電信寫

へハ石油、鐵礦、錫、「ニツケル」ノ商業的供給ノ保障均霽ヲ受ケ得ル様相互ニ協力スヘキコトヲ約ス

六 太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ關スル兩國ノ方針

兩國政府ハ本了解ノ基調ヲ爲ス支配的方針ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケ

ル平和ナルコト、協力的努力ニ依リ太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和ノ

維持及保全ニ貢獻スルハ兩國政府ノ根本目的ナルコト並ニ兩國

ノ何レモ前記地域ニ於テ領土的企圖ヲ有セサルコトヲ聲明ス

七 比律賓群島ノ中立化

日本國政府ハ合衆國政府カ希望スル時期ニ於テ合衆國政府ト比

律賓ノ獨立カ完成セラレヘキ際ニ於ケル比律賓群島ノ中立化ノ

タメノ條約締結ヲ目的トスル交渉ニ入ル用意アルコトヲ聲明ス

外機密

- 2 -

p.m.

"I proceeded to say how regrettable it seemed to me to be calculated on after receipt of (? that the Japanese Government) should continue to place is now in (? unquestioned) reliance on reports (probably emanating from interested quarters) ... (? contrary) not only to my own assurances but also to the public declaration made by yourself in the House of Commons. Assuming that the Japanese Government were sincere in their desire to avoid ... (? conflicts) over Siam, such punctuated (? reports) appeared to me to be fantastic, and I made an earnest appeal to His Excellency to place his cards on the table and give me some idea of the nature and the source of the reports on which they were acting. ... (If) His Excellency would deal with the matter thus an idea of (? in a spirit of frankness), I was prepared to be equally frank in explaining the point of view and intentions places commenced a (? of the H.M. Government). The Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed ... (? that

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

23

外機密

大 次 官
 歐 亞 司 長
 東 亞 務 長
 參 謀 總 長
 軍 令 部 長
 軍 令 部 次 長

21/8/41 K

Toyoda-Craigie Conversation I

(In double cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

August 18th, 3.15 a.m., 1941

Summary:

British forces concentrated on the Thai border: — Merely preparatory defence against the southward onset of German forces.

(Grew received from Craigie a copy of a telegram Craigie had sent — in an undecipherable cipher — to London reporting his conversation with the Foreign Minister.

Grew air-mailed the copy to Shanghai, whence it was radioed to Washington in a double cipher liable to mutilation under the best of conditions. The message was intercepted on the ether, and, on being deciphered, has proved to contain the most baffling mutilations. The interpositions (in the text made) are intended to make the message less unreadable; they are unsupported by anything but a fallible imagination born of an overtaxed brain.)

Section Two (Section One not intercepted).

Following from Tokyo by air-mail:

For the Department, No. 1235, August 14th, 3

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

22

外機密

SA

- 4 -

A. Concentration of British troops on the Siamese frontier. Japanese reports were to the effect that large ... country ... (? British forces) had been concentrated ready for an immediate incursion on to Siamese territory. I replied that this was a gross exaggeration: such British units ... (? as were) on the Siamese frontier were there purely for defensive purposes — as, indeed, were all our forces in Malaya and Burma — with Germany's ... (? troops) steadily pushing southwards, it was an elementary precaution that the border defences should be adequately ... (? Prepared).

B. Report that the "Warspite" was in the Gulf of Siam. Grew.

End of Section Two.

Lockhart.

本情報ハ
宛必親展
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信課長
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25

外機密

KS

- 3 -

if Anglo-Japanese relations) were to be prevented from going from injunction (? bad) to worse, a frank interchange of views was essential, and he then mentioned as follows (? the following) examples of the reports, which were creating so much concern in Japan, and invited my comments :

本情報ハ
宛必親展
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御再電
信課長
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24

外機密

- 2 -

p.m.

"I proceeded to say how regrettable it seemed to me to be calculated on after receipt of (? that the Japanese Government) should continue to place is now in (? unquestioned) reliance on reports (probably emanating from interested quarters) ... (? contrary) not only to my own assurances but also to the public declaration made by yourself in the House of Commons. Assuming that the Japanese Government were sincere in their desire to avoid ... (? conflicts) over Siam, such punctuated (? reports) appeared to me to be fantastic, and I made an earnest appeal to His Excellency to place his cards on the table and give me some idea of the nature and the source of the reports on which they were acting. ... (If) His Excellency would deal with the matter thus an idea of (? in a spirit of frankness), I was prepared to be equally frank in explaining the point of view and intentions places commenced a (? of the H.M. Government). The Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed ... (? that

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

27

外機密

A - 1845

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21/8/41

K

Toyoda-Craigie Conversation I.

(In double cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

August 18th, 3.15 a.m., 1941

Summary:

British forces concentrated on the Thai border: — Merely preparatory defence against the southward onset of German forces.

(Grew received from Craigie a copy of a telegram Craigie had sent — in an undecipherable cipher — to London reporting his conversation with the Foreign Minister.

Grew air-mailed the copy to Shanghai, whence it was radioed to Washington in a double cipher liable to mutilation under the best of conditions. The message was intercepted on the ether, and, on being deciphered, has proved to contain the most baffling mutilations. The interpositions (in the text made) are intended to make the message less unreadable; they are unsupported by anything but a fallible imagination born of an overtaxed brain.)

Section Two (Section One not intercepted).

Following from Tokyo by air-mail:

For the Department, No. 2255, August 14th, 3

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

26

外機密

SA

- 4 -

A. Concentration of British troops on the Siamese frontier. Japanese reports were to the effect that large ... country ... (? British forces) had been concentrated ready for an immediate incursion on to Siamese territory. I replied that this was a gross exaggeration: such British units ... (? as were) on the Siamese frontier were there purely for defensive purposes — as, indeed, were all our forces in Malaya and Burma — with Germany's ... (? troops) steadily pushing southwards, it was an elementary precaution that the border defences should be adequately ... (?prepared).

E. Report that the "Farspite" was in the Gulf of Siam. Grew.

End of Section Two.

Lockhart.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

29

外機密

KS

- 3 -

if Anglo-Japanese relations) were to be prevented from going from injunction (? bad) to worse, a frank interchange of views was essential, and he then mentioned as follows (? the following) examples of the reports, which were creating so much concern in Japan, and invited my comments :

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

28

外機密

- 2 -

nonsense on the face of it, and I thought it much more likely to have originated in Japanese than (in) British journalistic circles in Siam.

Individuality (? c). Russo-Japanese clash on Manchoukuo front.

This ... (? report) ambush (? had) spread with particular persistence from Singapore, although there ... (? is no foundation for) it whatsoever. No such clash had execrable (? occurred). I suggested to His Excellency that the ... (? report) had originated in Manchuria and had received wide currency, so that it was unfair to saddle Singapore with it.

... (? d). Speeches by Commander-in-Chief, Far East, ... have occupied (? and other) officers in Malaya.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

31

外機密

A 1844

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21/8/41 M

Teyeda-Craigie Conversation II

(In double cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

August 18th, 4.57 a.m., 1941

Summary:

The rumoured appearance of the "Warspite" in the Gulf of Thailand:— Nonsensical on the face of it.

Reports of Japanese-Soviet clash:— May have originated in Manchoukuo.

Bellicose utterances of British military officers:— Intended to reassure the British public against the growing menace.

Teyeda and Craigie agreed on the wisdom of observing the maxim "Silence is golden".

Section Three.

No. 1235.

This telegram, why has (? which it is) believed had originated tath (? somewhere) in Siam, had received wide currency. If untrue, it was unfortunate that we should have allowed the rumor to spread. I replied that the report, enlarges (? from the) form in which ... are sometimes (? is appeared) in the Press, was

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

30

外機密

- 4 -

defense of British territory. Nevertheless, I shared the opinion expressed by His Excellency that in such matters "silence is golden" and promised to growing out of dan (? to meet his wishes) on this point.

End of Section Three.

Grew.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

33

外機密

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- 3 -

The reiterated public messenger the Chinese Minister (? messages of) growing military and air strength in Malaya conveyed gade (? Britain's) aggressive intentions and had proved disturbing to the public mind in Japan. ... (? Their) effect was simply to increase the pressure on the Japanese Government to hasten the consequence of augmenting their own preparations to defend the sphere in which Japan had a route (? vital interest). He made a strong plea for the adoption of a calm and unprovocative attitude on the part of all concerned in handling the present delicate situation, promising to do his best murder codify why (? to that end) if the British authorities would do their part. I explained that our authorities in Malaya had to think of the morale of the local population, which might well peddling (? be) affected by the steady solidarity towards bowels (? growth of menace to the British) frontiers, ... (? had it not been for) public assurances that all necessary measures had been taken for the

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

32

外機密

- 2 -

nonsense on the face of it, and I thought it much more likely to have originated in Japanese than (in) British journalistic circles in Siam.

Individuality (? c). Russe-Japanese clash on Manchoukuo front.

This ... (? report) ambush (? had) spread with particular persistence from Singapore, although there ... (? is no foundation for) it whatsoever. No such clash had execrable (? occurred). I suggested to His Excellency that the ... (? report) had originated in Manchuria and had received wide currency, so that it was unfair to saddle Singapore with it.

... (? d). Speeches by Commander-in-Chief, Far East, ... have occupied (? and other) officers in Malaya.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

35

外機密

A 1844

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21/8/41 H

Toyoda-Craigie Conversation II

(In double cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

August 18th, 4.57 a.m., 1941

Summary:

The rumoured appearance of the "Warspite" in the Gulf of Thailand:— Nonsensical on the face of it.
Reports of Japanese-Soviet clash:— May have originated in Manchoukuo.
Bellicose utterances of British military officers:— Intended to reassure the British public against the growing menace.
Toyoda and Craigie agreed on the wisdom of observing the maxim "Silence is golden".

Section Three.

No. 1235.

This telegram, why has (? which it is) believed had originated tath (? somewhere) in Siam, had received wide currency. If untrue, it was unfortunate that we should have allowed the rumor to spread. I replied that the report, enlarges (? from the) form in which ... are sometimes (? is appeared) in the Press, was

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

34

外機密

- 4 -

defense of British territory. Nevertheless, I shared the opinion expressed by His Excellency that in such matters "silence is golden" and promised to growing out of dan (? to meet his wishes) on this point.

End of Section Three.

Grew.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

37

外機密

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- 3 -

The reiterated public messenger the Chinese Minister (? messages of) growing military and air strength in Malaya conveyed gade (? Britain's) aggressive intentions and had proved disturbing to the public mind in Japan. ... (? Their) effect was simply to increase the pressure on the Japanese Government to hasten the consequence of augmenting their own preparations to defend the sphere in which Japan had a roust (? vital interest). He made a strong plea for the adoption of a calm and unprovocative attitude on the part of all concerned in handling the present delicate situation, promising to do his best murder codify why (? to that end) if the British authorities would do their part. I explained that our authorities in Malaya had to think of the morale of the local population, which might well peddling (? be) affected by the steady solidarity towards bowels (? growth of menace to the British) frontiers, ... (? had it not been for) public assurances that all necessary measures had been taken for the

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

26

外機密

- 2 -

quite a weak Japanese ... Anglo-Japanese (? force had been sent to the) Siamese frontier, and that in fact I would be surprised to know how small was the Japanese force which had landed in Indo-China. (I abstained from asking for figures for fear of a request ... for information of the strength is encouraging - ? of British troops along the - frontier).

(4) A conversation then ensued on the economic position as regards Siam, particularly as regards rice, rubber and other materials which it was now ... (? become) more vital ... (? than) ever for Japan to secure from that country. Translation of (His Excellency) observed that ... (? the N.E.I.) under British influence had decided to join in the freezing of Japanese assets, with the result that it now and an act (? has become) essential for Japan to satisfy her urgent needs in such markets as were still cultivated (? open to) her.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外務省

39

外機密

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22/8/41

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Toyoda-Craigie Conversation III

(In double cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo
To Hull, Washington

August 18th, 5.15 a.m., 1941

Summary:

The Japanese forces along the Thai frontier are quite small. Japan is aggrieved by the British action in causing Thailand to stop rice exports to Japan. Britain is determined to uphold her right of making the necessary purchases in Thailand. Alay first British and Dutch fears regarding Japan's intentions.

Section Four.

No. 1235.

(3) I then reverted to the signs of Japanese pressure on Siam, quoting reports of concentrations of Japanese troops along the Siamese border and giving him sporadic examples of making every (? virulent) Japanese Press attacks and allegations against us. His Excellency replied that only

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外務省

38

外機密

- 4 -

apprehensions in regard to Japan's intentions in Siam should (continued to the following telegram)
End of Section Four.

Lockhart.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

41

外機密

- 3 -

Japanese-Thai trade, ... (? therefore), recently showed a natural tendency to increase owing to the difficulties ... (? attending) trade with third Powers, and the Japanese Government felt that they had a serious grievance against us for our ... (? action in) inducing Siam to stop the export to Japan of even such a vital foodstuff as rice. I was able Americans that equally (? told him that in that) respect ... (? he) was laboring under a complete misapprehension, adding, ascertain the reason (? with emphasis), that we were equally determined that our own right to purchase reasonable supplies of rice, rubber, et cetera, in Siam should not be interfered with by Japanese agencies. On His Excellency's can go (? observing) that the surest way to ease the economic situation to a great amount (? in) Siam would be to induce the N.E.I. to lessen the restrictions of exports to Japan, I suggested that he was putting the cart before the horse, and that the allevying of British and N.E.I.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

40

外機密

- 2 -

now reached a point, at which words and protests were useless and deeds were necessary to bring it home to the Japanese Government and public how close they were to the danger zone. In denying that the western (? Netherlands) East Indies' action in this matter had been due to British pressure or influence, I said that I assumed that the above considerations had also weighed with the Netherlands East Indies Government who must dispotically (? feel) threatened equally with us by the Japanese action in Indo-China. I did not need to inform His Excellency that the life line of our colonies with Australia ... (? and) New Zealand ran through the Netherlands East Indies, thus creating a common problem of defence. When he inquired, "defence reprisals" and I replied peacemaker (? defence) against Japan", His Excellency merely smiled and shook his head.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

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Toyoda-Craigie Conversation IV

(In double cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo
To Hull, Washington
August 17th, 2.50 a.m., 1941

Summary:

The economic restrictions are intended to make the Japanese realize "how close they are to the danger zone".
British life-line.

Section Five.

No. 1235.

(Continued from the preceding telegram) should be the prelude to any ... (? easing) of the economic restrictions imposed in the Netherlands East Indies we take (? and) elsewhere.

(5) I took the coping (? opportunity) to say that the main point of our economic restrictions on trade with Japan was, I believed, to bring home to the Japanese Government the fact that in our view Japan's successive southward advances had

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

外機密

- 4 -

(? most part), ... (? by) this telegram I am anxious to convey to you as correct an impression ... (as possible) of the character and views of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. The conversation ... (? lasted) an hour diminish (? and a half), and touched on many subsidiary points, which were far from perfect (in) our mutual ... (? comprehension), though perhaps ... were each telegram."

Sent to the Department via air-mail to Shanghai.

End of message.

Grew.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外務省

45

外機密

- 3 -

(6) In conclusion, we agreed that the main difficulty lay in the suspicions which each Power entertained of the intentions of the other, though I did not fail to ridicule the apprehensions ... power ... been steadily advancing southward until it had reached a point 15 hundred miles from Tokyo. The Minister for Foreign Affairs reasserted that this advance was necessitated solely by Japan's determination to bring her war with China to a spun (? speedy) conclusion, and he could only regret our apparent inability to accept his formal assurances that the advance into South Indo-China was neither directed, nor connoted any Japanese tensive miscalculated (? aggression against) Siam. ... (? we) agreed that our conversation might ... (? be regarded) as tending at least to dissipate unnecessary misunderstandings, and that ... (? it was) desirable to have ... (? free and) frank discussions.

(7) White ... (unsatisfactory) for the ...

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本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外務省

44

外機密

- 2 -

the only redeeming feature was His Excellency's marked to what (? betrayal of) enthusiasm obliged (? when) Germany was mentioned, and he smothered an ejaculation of acquiescence when I remarked that the root cause of the present phase of our troubles was the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Still this does not bring us any nearer to getting the Japanese out of Indo-China, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs made no comment when I expatiated at some length on this point, though he listened carefully.

(2) While I have little hope that these conversations can lead anywhere, it is encircled (? certainly) something to have got His Excellency misrepresenting (? talking) fairly freely, and, as he has twice suggested their continuance, he may eventually come out with something more constructive.

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外機密

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8/10/41 M

Recent Toyoda-Craigie Conversations:

Craigie's Impressions

(In figure cipher)

From Craigie, Tokyo

To Eden, London

August 28th, 1.40 p.m., 1941

Summary:

The Foreign Minister revealed greater pessimism than ever regarding Japanese-British relations.

He acquiesced in regarding the Axis Pact as the source of all trouble.

He may put forward a constructive proposal.

The leading rôle must be given to America. He regards her as a British tool.

(Note the date.)

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 534, August 25th, repeated to "Toroh" telegram No. 147, and Foreign Office. Please, pass to Washington telegram No. 275.

外務省

My immediately preceding telegram.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared more pessimistic at the outlook in Anglo-Japanese relations than I have yet known him. The conversation revolved round old arguments, and

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外機密

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本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

- 3 -

(3) I fully appreciate the importance of not crossing wires with the United States, to whom leading must be left in the present circumstances; but it is nevertheless my duty to keep our dip up as far as possible, particularly quality (? as) with me His Excellency shows a marked inclination to regard the United States as an innocent victim of our machinations. On this point, I to report (? refused) to be drawn beyond referring to America's well capacity to paddle her own canoe.

(4) I am keeping my United States colleague fully informed.

(5) If you wish me to take any particular line minesweeper (? at our) next interview, I should be grateful for early instructions.

Craigie.

外務省

48

外機密

- 2 -

Dominions and British Colonies, and it was difficult to discriminate in Japan as between the various categories of British subjects. I said I believed that the intention was that the freezing measures should be applied as uniformly as possible throughout the Empire, but that I would, of course, be ready to look into any case in which there was any radical disparity, and felt sure that my French and Canadian colleagues would be prepared to do the same. The Minister for Foreign Affairs took the point that competitive rigor in application could only lead to unnecessary hardship for individual British and Japanese nationals, and I urged that the Japanese Government should begin by modeling their regulations as closely as possible on those in force in the United Kingdom. I added that we already had many cases in which Japanese officials had shown a serious excess of zeal, and these were being brought to the attention of the proper Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外機密

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30/8/41 M

Toyoda-Craigie Conversation :

II. Freezing Regulations & Anti-Japanese Broadcasts

(In cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

August 28th, 4.48 p.m., 1941

Summary:

Craigie urges the "modelling" of Japanese freezing regulations on their British counterpart. The Foreign Minister raises the question of malicious broadcasts from Penang and Rangoon.

Section Two.

For the Department, No. 1315.

(Continued from the preceding telegram.) with the same freedom from bureaucratic interference as had been the case in Great Britain. The Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to take this up in the proper quarter; he admitted that in a general way the application of a freezing order in Great Britain had not been unreasonable, but he said that was by no means the case in some of the

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

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Toyoda-Craigie Conversation:

III. Encirclement of Japan

(In cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

August 28th, 4.52 p.m., 1941

Summary:

The Foreign Minister refers to the intense feeling engendered in Japan by the British-American-Dutch freezing of Japanese assets, and to the resultant worsening of relations. Craigie says the only solution is the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indo-China.

Section Three.

For the Department No. 1315.

(Continued from the preceding telegram) representations had on our side without effect. As long as this sort of thing continued, I did not see how I could be expected to make any representations on the subject of the broadcasts of which His Excellency now complained.

本情報ハ後一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

52

外機密

SA

- 3 -

(3) The Minister for Foreign Affairs then raised the following points:

(a) British broadcasts from Penang and Rangoon. These were now persistently directed to fomenting trouble between Japan and Siam and contained such ridiculous assertions as that an armed clash had already occurred between Japan and Thai troops, that a Japanese ultimatum had been addressed to Thailand, etc. This practice unbounded (? was) regrettable, and he hoped I would use my influence to discourage it. I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the numerous occasions on which I had drawn the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the very mischievous Tokyo broadcasts addressed in the language of the country to Burma, India and Malaya respectively, with the obvious purpose of stirring up feeling against Britain in British and Indian territory. Examples of this subversive propaganda had been given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but my (continued to the following telegram) End of Section Two. Grew.

本情報ハ後一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

51

外機密

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- 3 -

Our economic measures, taken in conjunction with the assistance we were rendering Chiang Kai-shek, and being an attempt at "encirclement", were rendering the "Normalization" of Anglo-Japanese relations even more difficult. He felt that, unless a remedy could be found, things would go from bad to worse, and there was a danger of serious trouble. I replied much along the lines of paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 1418, saying that frankly I could see no solution other than the withdrawal from Indo-China of Japanese troops which had started all the trouble. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, repeated that, if we "persisted in strengthening our encirclement of Japan and in such measures as stopping the importation by Japan of materials vital to her economy, I am afraid the situation may get worse, which we as representatives of our respective Foreign Offices must try to avoid".

(c) Use of foreign language in telephone conversations.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外務省

54

外機密

- 2 -

(b) Freezing of Japanese assets.

This step by Great Britain had, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserted, stirred up a most intense feeling in Japan -- so strong indeed that for internal political reasons the Japanese Government did not think it wise to curb a reasonably free expression of public opinion on the subject. Rightly or wrongly, the public believed that this action in which the United States and the Netherlands East Indies had joined, had been taken on Great Britain's initiative. The Japanese Government had naturally retaliated, the net result being a progressive deterioration in relations. He noted our decision that these counter-measures had been imposed on us by the stationing of Japanese troops in Indo-China, but he had given his positive assurance that Japan's action had been of a purely defensive character and that its primary purpose was the termination of the China incident.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外務省

53

外機密

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30/8/41

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Toyoda-Craigie Conversation:

IV. Telephone Language & Burma Road

(In cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

August 28th, 4:57 p.m., 1941

Summary:

The British ban on the use of foreign languages on the telephone is a war measure. It's now impossible for Britain to think of closing the Burma route again.

Section Four.

For the Department No. 1315.

(Continued from the preceding telegram) war, and that I believed that in the United Kingdom prohibition on telephoning in foreign languages had been in force as a war measure for a long time.

(d) Burma Road.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs repeated the usual arguments about the intense resentment

本情報ハ第一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

56

外機密

- 4 -

The Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared to regard the prohibition of the use of Japanese in Britain as part of recent reprisals, and pointed out that there was no prohibition in the United States. I replied that we were at (Continued to the following telegram)

End of Section Three.

Grew.

本情報ハ第一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

55

外機密

次官
田中
陸軍

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Toyoda-Craigie Conversation :

I. Anti-British Propaganda in Press, etc.

(In cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

August 29th, 7.30 p.m., 1941

Summary:

The Foreign Minister agreed on the wisdom of preventing mutual mud-throwings.

Section One.

Following from Tokyo:

For the Department, No. 1315, August 27th, 11 a.m. Following is the substance of a telegram sent by my British colleague to the Foreign Office, London, dated August 25th, 1941, reporting his conversation with the Minister on that date:

Begins. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call today in order to continue discussions on Anglo-Japanese relations.

(2) The Minister for Foreign Affairs having

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

58

外機密

- 2 -

of the Japanese people at out insistence on keeping this route open, and inquired whether, as a heroic attempt to prevent things going from bad to worse, I could not suggest that His Majesty's Government should once more consider the question of closing this route. I explained to His Excellency as clearly and courteously as I could why this course was now impossible.

At the end of our conversation, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked should be regarded as an expression of his personal views offered in reply to my plea for greater frankness, His Excellency suggested that we should both think carefully over what had passed and have another interview in a few days' time. Ends.

Sent to the Department via Shanghai.

End of message.

Grew.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

57

外機密

- 3 -

of the situation.

(b) Alleged public statements by Commander-in-Chief, Far East.

On the basis of information kindly supplied to me by the Commander-in-Chief, I was able to demonstrate to His Excellency that he had evidently been seriously misinformed on this point (doubtless on the basis of Japanese Press reports), Commander-in-Chief having delivered no address of any kind since May 1st last.

(c) Unfreezing of British official accounts.

The Ministry of Finance having demanded particulars of previous official and private expenditure of British Government establishments in Japan in order to establish a basis for future drawings from designated banks, I objected on principle both to the inquiries and to the whole idea of any maximum being placed on such expenditure and urged that this particular matter should be handled (? continued to the following telegram) Grew

End of Section One.

Lockhart.

K
本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

60

外機密

- 2 -

given me an opening, I mentioned the following points: (a) Anti-British campaign in the Japanese Press.

After referring to a Domei telegram from London, dated August 18th, to the effect that the "anti-Japanese campaign of the British Press, which has been in progress for over a month, has been suspended", I suggested that His Excellency should take this opportunity to discourage the continued flow of misrepresentation of our attitude in the Japanese Press, leaving with him examples taken from articles appearing during the past week. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was inclined to argue that he had repeatedly been an improvement in the tone of the Japanese Press, and that on the contrary he had heard officially that the British Press continued extremely hostile to Japan. Nevertheless, he promised to do what he could in the matter, agreeing with me that a slanging match of this kind could only add to ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Department~~ already serious difficulties

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

59

特支暗一九二

九月二十一日

「ニューデリー」

重慶軍令部宛

駐印重慶武官

美米軍ノ來印ニ關スル件

(一)英國カ北阿及近東ヨリ兵力ヲ印度ニ轉ストナス説ハ東部及西部「アフリカ」部隊ヲ印度ニ向ケルノ意ナランモ詳細ハ、(三)語不明)

(二)傳フル所ニ據レハ米軍ハ又印度ニ一工作^團ヲ到着セシメタルモ

其他ノ部隊ハ未タ來印シテラスト尙再度調査ノ上報告ス

(三)小官ハ在印米軍トハ私交ノ外正式交際ノ名目ナク又途上ノ風説ハ信賴シ能ハス尙來印米軍ハ〇〇ノ指揮ヲ受クヘシ爾後米軍ノ動向ニ關シテハ、(註、十語意味不解)

外務省

(日本標準規格B5) 東電 1730

61

九月二十一日

九月二十一日

莫斯科發

(第四三五)

駐蘇東亞大使館

駐蘇東亞大使

在蘇俄運轉檢閱ニ關スル件

蘇方新聞ノ報據ニ依テ、九月十二、十三ノ兩日在蘇俄運轉檢閱隊ハ莫斯科ニ於テ觀覽將校回國後檢閱隊ヲ檢閱ノ軍、官、民、兵ニ告グルノ書ヲ記筆通過トシテ又自由選人民委員會ト相提携シ俄兵大佐「ワノン」ヲ「イドロツヒ」トシテ主席トシ十四日ハ自由選人民委員會カ「ス」ヲ組織ヲ檢閲シテ選入新檢閱會主席及委員ヲ包括スル「ト」トシ「イドロツヒ」ヲ副主席トシ「ト」トシ

外務省

(日本標準規格B5) 東電 1730

62

支暗七二七

九月二十二日 重慶發

駐瑞西重慶公使宛

重慶情報司長

第十一號宣傳指示ニ關スル件

駐各國重慶大公使宛同文

一、我國ハ重火器ノ缺乏ニ依リ總反抗ハ尙準備ノ段階ニテリ敵モ泥
 足ヲ取ラレタルカ如キ状態ニシテ遠カニ大舉進攻ヲ開始ス
 ルノ餘力ナシ之即チ國內戰況沈滞ノ原因ナリ故ニ我方大規模進
 攻ノ爲ニハ當然大規模ノ援助ヲ必要トナスモノナリ

二、我カ西北開發移民計畫ハ日下進行中ニシテ河南省罹災民ノ新領
 省等ノ地域ニ移住スル者頗ル多シ

(日本標準規格B5) 東重 1730

特支暗一九三

九月二十三日 重慶發

重慶軍令部宛

駐瑞西重慶武官

西班牙ノ陸海空軍々備及政情ニ關スル件

西班牙ニハ陸軍合計三十七師團、正規軍約六十萬人アリ此ノ中三
 裝甲師團八ヶ師團アルモ裝備ハ非常ニ劣レリ

空軍ニ就テハ一年以來英米ヨリ購入セシ飛行機少カク其ノ總數
 ハ一千機ナリ

西班牙ノ海軍ハ一萬噸以下ノ各種軍艦八十七隻合計十二萬六千四
 十四噸アリ其ノ中速力三十三節ノ巡洋艦六隻速力三十六節ノ驅逐
 艦二十隻最新型二千百噸ノ水雷敷設艇六隻、砲臺四隻潜水艦十隻
 海防艦七十四隻、魚雷艇九隻、潛水艇防禦艦十二隻、補助艦十三隻

(日本標準規格B5) 東重 1730

復アリ

西班牙ハ英米及南米[?]各國ノ援助ニ依リ人民ノ生活ヲ恢復シ經濟的
 破産ヨリ免レント欲シアルヲ以テ復辟スルニ非サレハ其ノ目的ヲ
 達スル能ハス其ノ復辟運動ハ防止ノ方法ナシ
 「フランコ」ハ現在極力英國ト親シク政體ヲ維持スル爲ニ復辟
 ニ賛成シアリ但シ彼目ヲ組閣ニ當ランコトヲ要求シアリ
 現在「ローザンヌ」ニ在ル前王太子ハ天資學力共ニ劣リ非常ニ驕
 傲放縱ニシテ益自身及復辟黨ノモノハ「フランコ」トノ合作ヲ拒
 絶シ「フランコ」カ下野セハ始メテ復辟ヲ承諾セント要求スル狀
 態ナル爲沙汰止ミトナレリ
 西班牙ハ伊太利ノ局面カ變轉スル爲或ハ戰局ヨリ逃避スヘシ但シ

外務省

(日本標準規格 B5) 東京 1730

65

「フランコ」ハ蘇聯ノ反對アルヲ以テ戰後其地位ハ恐ラクハ保持
 シ難カルヘシ

外務省

(日本標準規格 B5) 東京 1730

66

REEL No. A-0300

アジア歴史資料センター

支那省一九四

重慶外交部宛

米國ノ戰後國際合作ニ關スル件

駐米重慶大使

(第三〇號)

米國上院外交委員會主席「コナリー」(Connelly)ハ昨日「戰後
ノ國際合作ニ參加スル案ニ對シ上院ハ英、米、蘇三國首長會議後
ニ於テ更ニ討議ヲ行ハントス上院ニ於ケルソノ條約批准ノ制限ヲ
有スル關係上其ノ決議ハ重大ナル國際的影響ヲ惹起スルカ故ニ眞
重ニ之ニ對處セサルヲ得ス」ト表示セリ

外務省

(日本標準規格B5) 東京 1730

67

ト

21日

支暗七三〇

九月二十四日

ストツクホルム發

(第二三號)

重慶外交部次長宛

駐瑞西重慶公使

芬蘭ノ國情ニ關スル件

芬

米國駐芬蘭代理公使來談シテ曰ク「芬蘭人ハ和平ヲ希望シ居レルモ
歐情劇ニテハ依然米國ニ調停ヲ請フノ意ナク更ニ食糧ハ撙節ヨリ
救済ヲ受ケツツアル現状ナレハ和平ヲ爲セントスルモ亦問題ナリ
況ヤ一級芬蘭人ハ尙一九三九年ノ境界ヲ保持センコトヲ望ミ又更
ニ東「カレリヤ」ノ占有ヲモ要求シ居レル現状ナリ

數日前芬蘭首相來談シテ曰ク「保障的和平ヲ希望シ北歐ノ結合及ヒ
米國トノ友好ヲ主張セルト共ニ英國ノ敵トナリタルコトヲ後悔シ

外務省

(日本標準規格B5) 東京 1730

68

REEL No. A-0300

アジア歴史資料センター

居レリトノコトナリシカ察観ハ依然其時的表示ヲ爲シテ知テ
獨逸國ノ不満ヲ買ヒ得レリ

現ニ獨逸軍ハ屢次敗退シ居リ固ク所ニ據レハ「エズトアニヤ」ヲ
キ放棄セントシ居リ然ル場合ニハ獨逸ノ交通益々困難トナリ守備
ヲシテ蘇聯ニ官ヲシムルニ到底支ニ得サルカ故ニ「ヘルマンヤ」
ニテハ既ニ俄度ノ恐慌ヲ來シ居レリトノコトナリ

外務省

(日本標準規格JIS) 東京 1730

支暗七三五

九月二十四日

（第五八號）

駐蘇連境大使宛

駐蘇外交部長

英米蘇會談ニ關スル件

顧大使ヨリノ電報ニ據レハ情報ニ據レハ「イデーデン」ハ米國代表
「ハリマン」ト共ニ莫斯科ニ赴キテ蘇聯當局ト英米蘇會談ヲ開カ
ント爲シ居レリ云々トノコトナリ至急採査ノ上當方ニ電報セラレ
タシ

外務省

(日本標準規格JIS) 東京 1730

外機密

- 2 -

Chinese territory genius (? for) a necessary period for the purposes referred to above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.

(4) Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces.

The Japanese armed forces which have been despatched to China for carrying out the China affairs will be withdrawn from China upon the settlement of the said affairs, excepting those troops which come under point 3.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

74

外機密

大臣
次官
東亞局長

25/9/41

KS

Nine Points for China Settlement

(In double cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

September 22nd, 11.40 p.m., 1941

No. 1498, September 22nd, 9 p.m.

Strictly confidential for the Secretary and Under-Secretary only.

- (1) Neighborly friendship.
- (2) Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- (3) Cooperative defense between Japan and China.

Cooperation between Japan and China for the purposes of preventing Communist and other subversive activities which may constitute a menace to the security of both countries, and of maintaining the public order in China.

Stationing have they arranged (? of) Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

73

外
機
密

SA

- 3 -

(5) Economic cooperation.

(a) There shall be economic cooperation between Japan and China, having the development and utilization of essential materials for national defense in China as its principal objective.

(b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict will demand (? any) economic activities by third Powers in China so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

(6) Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek Régime and the Wang Ching-wei Government.

(7) No annexation.

(8) No indemnities.

(9) Recognition of manhoneycombkuo (? Manchoukuo).

Grew.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外
務
省

75

REEL No. A-0300

0406

アジア歴史資料センター

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

昭一六一〇二

一、既報在佛印支那領事館事件ノ交渉ニ對スル佛外相ノ回答

二、駐佛米大使館參事ノ談

佛國ハ日本ノ佛印増兵ニ關シ米國ノ干涉ヲ甚々希望シアリト

重慶外交部宛

グイシー郭參事三十日發

一〇二一六二八受(七)

外機密

第三〇號電

第六二號電(駐、支特暗第二七八六號)拜承

昨今二回ニ亘リ命ニ違ヒテ佛外相ニ對シ交渉セルニ其ノ回答ニ

特支二八一〇

據レハ

「二十五日夜海防警察ハ日本軍ニ武装解除セラレ同夜日本軍ハ支那人佛印人數十名ヲ逮捕セリ佛印總督ハ二十六日朝直チニ駐佛印日本軍司令官ニ對シ抗議ヲ提出セリ而シテ佛政府ハ其ノ消息ヲ得タル後駐日佛大使ヲシテ日本側ニ抗議ノ上逮捕セラレタル支那人佛印人ノ釋放方ヲ交渉セシムルト同時ニ駐重慶佛大使ニ打電シ支那政府ニ對シ遺憾ノ意ヲ表セシメタルカ茲ニ再ヒ東京及河内ノ兩處ニ確實ニ交渉スル如ク打電スヘシ」云々
尙殖民省ノ密報ニ據レハ逮捕セラレタル華僑ハ既ニ數名銃殺セラレ佛印ノ情勢ハ頗ル緊張シアルモノノ如シト

外機密

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

又米國大使館參事ハ昨日佛外務次官ニ向ヒ佛印問題ヲ談セルニ
「佛側ハ日本カ再ヒ佛印ニ増兵ヲ行ヒタルコトニ對シ悲觀且意
外ノ感ヲ抱キアリ米國側ノ干涉方ヲ甚々希望シアリ」云々

外務省

77

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

昭一六一〇二

佛印ニ於ケル支那領事館事件ニ關スル佛印細部局長及外務次官ノ談話ヲ報告ス
何レモ支那側ヲ積極的ニ支援シ四十八時間静觀セラレ度ト辨ス

東京外交部宛

「ヴィシー」郭泰事一日發

一〇三〇五二〇受(七一)

第三一號電

第六五號電(駐支特附第二八一六號)拜承

本日佛細部局長ニ面接センカ彼ハ左ノ様ニ語レリ

「今朝佛外相ハ駐日佛大使及佛印總督ニ對シ日本側ハ速ニ支那總領事館小使及華僑ノ釋放ヲ交渉スル稜電命スルト共ニ佛印總督

外機密

ニ對シ駐西貢領事館及在佛印華僑ノ保護方ヲ電命セリ

支那政府カ現在駐佛印領事館ノ撤退ヲ拒絕セル件ニ就テ佛側ハ充分諒解シアリ

既ニ尹領事ハ「ダラット」ニ到着セルカ該處ハ佛印總督府ノ所在地ニシテ亦佛印政廳ノ所在地トモ見做サレアリ

尹領事及館員ハ身分ノ間該處ニ留マリ以テ保護ヲ容易ナラシメン事ヲ希望ス

又本日午後佛外務次官代理ハ左ノ如ク回答セリ

「華僑ノ釋放ニ關スル對日交渉等ノ各件ニ對シ余ハ積極的ニ處理スルヲ以テ支那側ニ於テハ四十八時間静觀セラレ度ト

外機密

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

南京

十月九日 南京發

駐日大使宛

汪兆銘

汪兆銘ノ近衛首相ニ致セル回答書翰ニ關スル件

近衛首相ノ親書ニ對スル余ノ書翰ハ日高公使一時歸國ノ幸便ニ託シタリ該翰ノ内容ハ前ニ余カ兄ニ致セル電報ノ大意ト同様ナルカ
嚴ニ秘密ニ附セラレシコトヲ請フ

外務省

外機密

- 2 -

infringe and disregard French sovereignty in that area and which the British Government found difficult to reconcile with the declaration of Japan's peaceful intentions. A memorandum attached to the aide-mémoire relations with ... (? lists in) support of the foregoing certain recent activities on the part of the Japanese military, including: demands accompanied by threat of force for the transfer of private property in Indo-China to Japanese interests; arrest of private citizens at the instance of the Japanese military on various pretexts; unauthorized search of private residences and pressure on private citizens to co-operate with the Japanese authorities; demands for additional military facilities and establishments in Indo-China and requisition of property for such purposes under duress; erection of barricades, occupation of police stations, and other interference with the normal life at Hanoi and Haiphong on the part

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

81

外務省

外機密

4/11/41 H

Togo-Craigie Conversation:
Japanese Action in Indo-China I

(In cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo
To Hull, Washington

October 31st 4.15 p.m., 1941

Summary:

- (1) The gist of the British aide-mémoire and memorandum protesting against certain Japanese actions in Indo-China.
- (2) The Foreign Minister said he would look into certain actions of which he had no confirmation.

Section One.

No. 1721, October 31st, 5 p.m.

(1) My British colleague sought and obtained an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs October 29th primarily for the purpose of leaving with him an aide-mémoire expressing the concern of the British Government over recent activities of the Japanese military in French Indo-China, which would appear to indicate an intention to

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

80

外務省

外機密

A -
G

4/11/41

Togo-Oraigie Conversation:
Japanese Action in Indo-China II

(In cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo
To Hull, Washington

October 31st, 5.55 p.m., 1941

Summary:
Oraigie thought that the Foreign Minister was hinting at a possible advance into countries neighbouring Indo-China. He told the Foreign Minister that such action would immediately evoke military counteraction.

Section Two.
No. 1721.

(3) Although the British Ambassador had intended to confine his observations concerning Indo-China to the specific question of the recent activities of the Japanese military, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his own initiative, brought up the broader aspects of the Japanese occupation of Indo-China and reviewed the familiar Japanese arguments in justifi-

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

83

外機密

- 3 -

of the Japanese military authorities; all of the above actions have been taken in disregard of the protests by the French authorities.

(2) The Minister for Foreign Affairs attempted to argue that the actions of the Japanese authorities in Indo-China were taken in full agreement with the French authorities, but when the Ambassador pointed out that the actions referred to were taken in disregard of French protests, the Minister stated that he had no confirmation of the activities in question and would inquire into the matter.

End of Section One.

Grew.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

82

外機密

- 3 -

(4) The Ambassador then frankly told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that since Japan was now established in geographic areas in close proximity to the vital life-lines of the British Empire, in his opinion any further advance in those areas could only be regarded as aimed directly at Great Britain and would provoke immediate counteraction which would not, as in the past, be confined to economic measures. He went on to say that, while it was still the desire of the British Government to avoid trouble with Japan which would cause incalculable harm to both countries and would only benefit Germany, it would be a great mistake on the part of the Japanese military authorities to assume that Great Britain was either afraid of Japan or insufficiently prepared to meet any threat to British security in Southeastern Asia.

End of message.

Grew.

K

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

85

外機密

- 2 -

fication of the presence of Japanese troops there, to which the Ambassador made a suitable reply. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then said that in any case at the time it was extremely important to prevent and (? any) further aggravation of the situation, which in the present delicate state of affairs, might necessitate an extension of Japan's military measures. Although the Minister made no reference to any country other than Indo-China, the Ambassador received the distinct impression, and so reported to his Foreign office, that the Minister was hinting at the possibility of some advance into neighboring countries.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

84

外機密

- 2 -

for Foreign Affairs:

"I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs ... (? this afternoon) in the terms of your telegram, handing him a note of what I had said to avoid misunderstanding. The Minister for Foreign Affairs began by referring to Mr. Churchill's references to Japan in his speech on Monday, observing that this constituted a 'rather strong warning' to his country in connection with the American-Japanese negotiations. His Excellency could not but regard this statement as unfortunate, particularly as the Prime Minister admittedly did not know the details of the negotiations ... the ... (? or the) stage which they had now reached. The statement appeared to simplify the matter too much, and in any case, if the Prime Minister's desire was to facilitate an agreement, there were surely other and better ways of doing this. I replied that the Prime Minister had evidently felt that the moment had come when the Japanese Government and people must be left in a

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

87

外務省

外機密

15/11/41

Togo-Craigie Conversations:
Japanese-American Negotiations I

(In double cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

November 13th, 10.20 p.m., 1941

Summary:

- T.—Churchill's remarks a "rather strong warning"; and unfortunate, because he shouldn't know much about the matter.
- C.—Obviously he thought the British position should be made clear, for misunderstanding breeds war.
- T.—it's not correct to say the conversations are in the exploratory stage.

Section One.

No. 1796, November 13th, 3 p.m.

Strictly Confidential. For the Secretary and Under-Secretary only.

The following is the substance of a telegram sent to the Foreign Office ... (? in London) by the British Ambassador at Tokyo, reporting his ... (? conversation) on November 11th with the Minister

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86

外務省

外機密

15/11/41

Togo-Craigie Conversations:
Japanese-American Conversations II

(In double cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

November 13th, 11.30 p.m., 1941

Summary:

T.—The two parties are now discussing details of a prospective agreement, only three points remaining outstanding.

Churchill should know the talks are no longer exploratory; things will hereafter move quickly.

C.—It's supremely important for Japan to come to terms with America. Urge patience and prudence, especially in military circles.

Section Two.

No. 1796.

(Continued from the preceding telegram) assumed ...
(? the character) of negotiations, and so informed the United States Government, though they had not yet heard their views on this point. The two parties

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

89

外機密

- 3 -

condition ... (? no doubt as to) where we stood the President and (? .) Wars had in the past occurred through misunderstanding and miscalculation, and from this point of view there was advantage in clarifying the issues, particularly in view of the threatening language of the Japanese. Judging from the fragmentary reports of the speech which had reached me, I gathered that the general tone of the references to Japan had been friendly of this (? .)

"(2) Turning to the negotiations themselves, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that ...
(? the situation) was, for the reasons given me in our last interview, now one of urgency and must 'materialize speedily'. He did not agree that, after pleasance (? nearly) seven months of ... (? talks ?), it was correct to speak of the conversations as begin with (? being) in the exploratory stage. On the contrary, the Japanese Government regarded them as having (continued to the following telegram)

End of Section One.

Grew.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

88

外務省

外務省

外機密

- 3 -

Nevertheless, he felt it right that you should realize that the negotiations were no longer in the exploratory stage, and that changes in the industry (? things in the Far East) hereafter move quickly, particularly in view of the forthcoming session of the Diet.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

91

外機密

- 2 -

were no longer discussing the meeting, but were considering in detail the points for inclusion in instruments which would cover the whole field. The Japanese Government had recently put forward proposals in which they had made their maximum concessions, and he earnestly hoped that these would be acceptable to the United States. If so, the conclusion of an agreement should be possible in a week or ten days—indeed not only possible but necessary. There were only three points now outstanding, however, realizing (? regarding) the extent to which British ... restated these discussions the Japanese Government had expressed the opinion to the United States Government agreement, but had not yet received the United States Government's answer on this point. Clearly the question of the appropriate moment for His Majesty's Government to participate in the discussion was one which primarily concerned the United States and British Governments, and it was not for him to make any definite proposal on a point which affected Anglo-American relations.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

90

外機密

- 5 -

referred to in the first sentence of the last paragraph thereof are being transmitted to the Department in my following telegram.

End of message.

Grew.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

93

外機密

- 4 -

"(3) Before leaving, I urged upon His Excellency I presume (? the necessity of) a supreme effort being made to bring about an agreement with the United States, and added that I could not myself see anything in the situation which demanded so the hearing will take place bridmaid (?) an important negotiation. His Excellency had spoken of the impatience of the Japanese people, but, speaking off the record, I suggested that the impatience of the Japanese Army would be a more appropriate explanation. The which could handed tactics (?) dear to the military mind were not the best suited to a delicate diplomatic situation such as the present, and I hoped that His Excellency would do everything in his power to counsel prudence in these quarters which were now seeking to precipitate a crisis".

The text of the note referred to in the first paragraph of the above-quoted substance of the telegram and the text of the oral statement

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

92

外機密

- 2 -

agreement with the United States Government as against the desperate risks to Japan of allowing a situation to develop, in which it may no longer be possible to control the issue of peace or war."

(2) "Oral. Although His Majesty's Government are not fully acquainted with the details of the conversations which have been taking (place), they are aware that the United States Government have been seeking a basis of discussion with the Japanese Government with a view to a general settlement in the Far East. They believe such settlement to be in the best interests of Great Britain and of Japan herself, and it is their earnest desire that these should be achieved. It cannot be expected, however, that the giving should be all on our side and my Government see no urgency in entering upon negotiations unless some basis of discussion can be agreed upon in advance for establishing the principles on which the agreement will be sought.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

95

外務省

外機密

15/11/41 M

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G

Craigie's Notes to Togo

(In cipher)

From Grew, Tokyo

To Hull, Washington

November 13th, 7.40 p.m., 1941

Summary:

One urging the necessity of an agreement being reached between Japan and America; and another concerning the time for British participation in the negotiations.

No. 1797, November 13th, 4 p.m.

Strictly Confidential. For the Secretary of State and Under-Secretary only.

The following two communications were made by my British colleague to the Foreign Minister in their conversation on November 11th, reported in another telegram:

(1) "On authority from the Foreign Office I spoke to Mr. Togo along the following line:

" I would urge upon Your Excellency the advantage of a supreme effort being made to reach

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

94

外務省

外機密

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15/11/41 M

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本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

97

外機密

SA

- 3 -

This part of the proceedings my Government are content to leave in the hands of the United States Government, who are well aware of their position. Moreover, the United States Government have assured them (and they believe that they have so informed the Japanese Government) that, should actual negotiations become possible, they will at once consult His Majesty's Government. At that point my Government will be very ready to collaborate with the Japanese Government and the United States Government in seeking a solution of our joint problems."

Grew.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

96

外機密

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Grew.

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

99

外機密

- 2 -

agreement with the United States Government as against the desperate risks to Japan of allowing a situation to develop, in which it may no longer be possible to control the issue of peace or war."

(2) "Oral. Although His Majesty's Government are not fully acquainted with the details of the conversations which have been taking (place), they are aware that the United States Government have been seeking a basis of discussion with the Japanese Government with a view to a general settlement in the Far East. They believe such settlement to be in the best interests of Great Britain and of Japan herself, and it is their earnest desire that these should be achieved. It cannot be expected, however, that the giving should be all on our side and my Government see no urgency in entering upon negotiations unless some basis of discussion can be agreed upon in advance for establishing the principles on which the agreement will be sought.

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

98



外機密

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28/11/41

S

Washington Conversations:

Hull's Oral Statement I

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

November 26th, 10.50 p.m., 1941

Section One.

No. 784, November 26th, 9 p.m.

Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counselor only.


The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at my request on November 26th.

I handed the Japanese Ambassador an oral statement substantially as follows:

It is believed that some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which we have been discussing for the exploratory conversations in an effort to reach a settlement of problems of the entire Pacific area. Included amongst those

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省



外機密

A -
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28/11/41

S

Hull Documents Handed Japanese Delegates

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

November 26th, 9.30 p.m., 1941

No. 783, November 26th, 8 p.m.

Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counselor only.

I called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in the afternoon of November 26th, and gave them two documents—an oral statement and draft outline of a proposed basis for a broad agreement covering the entire Pacific area.

A summary of these documents follows in a subsequent telegram.

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外務省

外機密

- 3 -

flit with the fundamental principles to which each Government has committed itself and would not be likely to further our ultimate objectives (continued to the following telegram)

End of Section One.

Hull.

~~(Section Two not yet received.)~~

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

103

外機密

- 2 -

principles are the principles of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation to improve world conditions through peaceful ways and means, and to prevent and solve controversies, inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty, no interference in internal affairs of other nations and the principle of equality. Mention is made of the proposals of the Japanese Government received on November 20th and recent statements of the Japanese ambassador that his Government desires to continue these conversations, and that a modus vivendi would be helpful toward creating a propitious atmosphere.

This Government most earnestly desires to further the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area, and so provide full opportunity to continue discussions with the Japanese Government looking to the working out of a broad program of peace. In the opinion of this Government, the Japanese proposals of November 20th in some ways con-

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

102

外機密

- 2 -

already concluded by either with any third Power or Powers will be interpreted so as to conflict with this agreement's fundamental purpose—establishment and preservation of peace in the entire Pacific.

(4) Both Governments to seek the conclusion of an agreement amongst the Netherlands, Thai, American, British, Chinese, and Japanese Governments calling for plans on the part of each Government or expect (? to respect) Indo-China's territorial integrity, and, should a threat to that integrity develop, to embark upon immediate consultation with regard to that threat; such agreement to provide also that each signatory would not accept or seek preferential economic or commercial treatment in Indo-China and each signatory would exert its influence toward obtaining for all signatories equality of treatment in those matters.

End of Section Three.

Hull.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

105

外機密

外機密

28/11/41

Washington Conversations:

III. Hull's Proposals 1-4

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

November 27th, 2.20 a.m., 1941

Section Three (~~Section Two not yet received~~).

No. 784, November 26th, 9 p.m.

The Second Section of the draft proposals for ten steps to be taken.

(1) Both Governments to exert their influence to bring about to their (? other) Governments' adherence to and practical application of the basic political and economic principles set forth.

(2) Both Governments to seek the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact amongst Thailand, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States.

(3) Both Governments to agree that no agreement

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

104

外機密

- 2 -

agreement on the basis of mutual reductions of tariffs, including an American undertaking to bind (? place) raw silk on the free list, and of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment.

(8) Both Governments to remove their freezing restrictions on each other's funds.

(9) Both Governments to agree upon a dollar-yen rate stabilization plan, each allocating one half of the funds adequate for that purpose.

(10) Both Governments not to support—economically, politically, militarily—any Government or régime in China except the National Government located temporarily at Chungking.

An account of the conversation will be sent you in a later telegram.

End of message.

Hull.

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本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

107

外機密

28/11/41

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Washington Conversations:

IV. Hull's Proposals 5-10

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington.

To Grew, Tokyo

November 27th, 2.35 a.m., 1941

Section Four.

No. 784, November 26th, 10 p.m.

(5) Japan to withdraw from China and Indo-China all police, air, naval and military forces.

(6) Both Governments to give up all extra-territorial rights in China and rights and interests in and with regard to Concessions, International Settlements and rights under the Boxer Protocol, both Governments to seek to obtain from other Governments, including the British, an agreement to give up all similar rights in China.

(7) Both Governments to undertake negotiations toward conclusion of an American-Japanese trade

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本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

106

外機密

- 2 -

The first section contained a draft mutual declaration in which there was embodied affirmation by both Governments that their national policies have as their objectives extensive and enduring peace, that both Governments are without territorial designs, that both have no intention to threaten other nations or to use aggressive military force, and that accordingly they will give active support and practical application to certain fundamental principles. There are then listed the four principles which are mentioned above in the Oral Statement.

Both Governments agree practically to apply and actively support five economic principles in a program to eliminate and to prevent recurrent political instability (and) economic collapse, and provide a basis for peace. Those principles call for (a) the establishment of international financial institutions and arrangements designed to aid essential enterprises and continuous development of

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

109

外務省

外機密

外機密

29/11/41

Washington Conversations:

II. First Part of Hull's Proposal

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

November 27th, 3 a.m., 1941

Section Two (~~Sections One, Three & Four~~ submitted yesterday).

No. 784, November 26th, 9 p.m.

It is suggested that further effort toward resolving divergencies of views on the practical application of those principles be made. There is, therefore, offered the Japanese Government a draft plan as one practical manifestation of the sort of program this Government has in mind to be worked out during further discussions. The hope is expressed that there may be expedited progress toward a meeting of minds.

The draft proposal for a broad-gauge settlement was substantially as follows:

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

108

外務省

外機密

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1712/41
大臣
次官
亞米利加局長

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Hull Documents:

Kurusu-Hull Conversation I

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

November 28th, 4.30 a.m., 1941

Summary:

Kurusu indicated that it's impossible for Japan to consider Hull's proposal as it stands.

Section One.

No. 787, November 27th, 7 p.m.

Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counselor only.

After reading the documents summarized in the Department's telegram under reference, Mr. Kurusu asked whether these documents represented the reply of this Government to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary said that, just as Japan had to deal with a domestic political situation, this Government also had its internal political problems, and that the

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

111

外機密

- 5 -

all nations and to utilize processes of trade to permit payments consonant with the welfare of all nations; (b) non-discrimination in commercial relations between nations; (c) non-discriminatory access to raw materials; (d) abolition of expressions of extreme nationalism such as exclusive trade restrictions and promotion of international economic cooperation; (and) (e) full protection of consuming countries' and populations' interests as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

Hull.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

110

外機密

- 3 -

consider the proposal that Japan withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and withdraw all support from régimes or Governments in China except that of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Secretary inquired whether we should not work out these questions.

Mr. Kurusu suggested that, as his Government would be likely to throw up its hands amour (? against the) proposal and as the document was marked tentative and without commitment, it might be the wiser course further to discuss it informally before sending it to the Japanese Government.

End of Section One.

Hull.

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

113

外機密

- 2 -

suggestion contained in the documents he had given the Ambassador represented all that we could do at this time in the light of the Japanese proposals. The Secretary went on to mention that the proposal he had just given the Japanese would make possible certain international financial arrangements which were not acutally outlined in the documents.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the arrangement suggested in the documents which he had just received. He mentioned Japan's bitter experience with international organizations as the basis for his objection to the proposed multilateral non-aggression pacts. He added that China had received the wrong impression from the Washington Treaties and had used them advantageously to flaunt (? flout) Japan's rights. He said that, if this proposal represented the ideas of the American Government, he did not see the possibility of any agreement, and added that he did not see how the Japanese Government could

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外務省

112

外機密

- 2 -

democratic countries in territories near Indo-China, and indicated that, should Japan pour troops into Indo-China, the American people would have misgivings as to the possible menace in countries south and west of Indo-China and to our direct interests.

Mr. Kurusu offered specious and unconvincing arguments on Japan's difficulty in renouncing support of Wang Ching-wei, and observed that the standing of the Nanking Régime was a matter of opinion.

The Japanese clearly indicated their disappointment over our response to their proposal and their feeling that we had reached an end. They asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi, whether any other arrangement was not possible and whether they could see the President.

The Secretary replied that we had explored the question of a modus vivendi, and, in response to a further inquiry as to whether our inability to consider a modus vivendi was because of the attitude of other Powers, he added that he had done his

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

115

外務省

外機密

1/12/41

Hull Documents:

Kurusu-Hull Conversation II

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

November 28th, 3.55 a.m., 1941

Summary:

Hull rejected the idea of working out a modus vivendi.

Section Two.

No. 787, November 27th, 7 p.m.

The Secretary suggested that the Japanese might want carefully to study the documents before further discussion. The Secretary said that, with the public having lost its perspective, it was necessary to present a complete picture of our position. He mentioned the acute public feeling on the oil question, and reminded the Japanese of the great injury being done to the United States by Japan's immobilizing large forces of

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

114

外務省

外機密

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2/12/41

America's Draft Modus Vivendi

I

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

November 28th, 7.20 p.m., 1941

Section One.

No. 796, November 28th, 7 p.m.

Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counselor only.

Following the Japanese proposals of November 20th (continued to the following telegram),

End of Section One.

Hull.

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

117

外機密

- 3 -

best. He said that the President would undoubtedly be glad to see the Japanese (an appointment for such a meeting has been arranged for November 27th)

Reference, Department's No. 784, November 26th, 9 p.m.

End of message.

Hull.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再同乞フ

外務省

116

外機密

- 2 -

ment, simultaneously with the proposal which was actually given them on November 26th, an alternate plan for a temporary modus vivendi. The draft under consideration at that time called for a temporary modus vivendi to be in effect for a period of three months, during which time conversations would continue toward the working out of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. At the end of the period of the term of the modus vivendi, both Governments would confer at the request of either to determine whether the extension of the modus vivendi was justified by the prospects of reaching a settlement ... East Asia and the Southern Pacific area an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from Southern French Indo-China (and) to limit those in Northern Indo-China to the number there on July 26th, 1941, which number should not be subject to replacement, and Japan should not in any case send additional naval, military or air forces to Indo-China.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

119

外務省

外機密

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2/12/41 SA

America's Draft Modus Vivendi

II

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

November 29th, 1 a.m., 1941

Summary:

Details of a modus vivendi which America did consider and on which Britain, the Netherlands, Australia and China were consulted.

Section Two.

No. 796, November 28th, 7 p.m.

(Continued from the preceding telegram) the Department gave consideration to a number of alternate proposals and counter-suggestions or combinations thereof, which suggested themselves to the Department for possible presentation to the Japanese Government. At one time, the Department considered the question of presenting to the Japanese Govern-

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

118

外務省

外機密

- 4 -

the question of their taking similar economic measures.

At a certain point in our consideration of the draft modus vivendi, the representatives in Washington of the British, Dutch, Australian and Chinese Governments were consulted.

End of Section Two.

Hull.

本情報ハ御覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

121

外機密

- 3 -

This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to 600, 000 dollars monthly, a small amount of petroleum within categories now permitted (for) general export on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in general, provided that raw silk constitutes at least two-thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments on

本情報ハ御覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

120

外機密

- 2 -

telegrams of the documents handed the Japanese Ambassador on November 26th and of the conversation which took place on that date.

End of message.

Hull.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

123

外機密

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2/12/41

S

America's Draft Modus Vivendi

III

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

November 28th, 9.05 p.m., 1941

Summary:

The draft modus vivendi was abandoned and concealed from the Japanese.

Section Three.

No. 796.

After careful consideration of all factors in the situation within the United States and in the general world situation, including the reaction and replies of the Governments mentioned above, it was decided that we should drop the draft modus vivendi, which we had under consideration. That draft modus vivendi was not handed to the Japanese, and the fact that this Government had considered a modus vivendi was not mentioned to them.

The Department has informed you in separate

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

122

外機密

- 2 -

(3) Both countries to cooperate in obtaining necessary commodities from ... but ...

(4) Both countries not to make any armed advancement into areas of South-Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific except Japanese-occupied French Indo-China.

(5) Japan to withdraw its troops from Indo-China following either peaceful settlement between Japan and China or establishment of equitable peace in the Pacific area. In the interim Japan to remove its troops from ... (? Southern Indo-China) into Northern Indo-China upon conclusion of this arrangement which would later be made ... (? into) a final agreement.

End of Section One (Section Two not yet received.)

Hull.

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

125

外機密

2/12/41

S

Japan's Five-Point Proposal

As Telegraphed to Chungking

(In machine cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Gauss, Chungking

November 29th, 5.35 p.m., 1941

Section One.

No. 277, November 28th, 3 p.m.

Strictly confidential for the Ambassador only.

On November 30th the Japanese addressed a five-point proposal for a temporary agreement substance as follows:

(1) The United States to refrain from actions prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace in China.

(2) Both countries to remove freezing restrictions and to restore commercial relations. The United States to ... as and required amount of petroleum.

外務省

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

124

外機密

- 2 -

(3) Both countries to cooperate in obtaining necessary commodities from ... but ...

(4) Both countries not to make any armed advancement into areas of South-Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific except Japanese-occupied French Indo-China.

(5) Japan to withdraw its troops from Indo-China following either peaceful settlement between Japan and China or establishment of equitable peace in the Pacific area. In the interim Japan to remove its troops from ... (? Southern Indo-China) into Northern Indo-China upon conclusion of this arrangement which would later be made ... (? into) a final agreement.

End of Section One. (Section Two not yet received.)

Mull.

外務省

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27

外機密

2/12/41

Japan's Five-Point Proposal
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外務省

本情報ハ一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

126

國家機密

極秘

一、用済後焼却スベシ
二、本情報ノ利用ニハ注意ヲ要ス

米特暗號外第二一號

一六、一、三〇
第十八班

末栖「ハル」會談内容

駐日米大使宛

米國務長官奈

一、二、八、四、三〇、奈

通電先 重慶

國務省電第七八七号(三十七日十九時附)

國務省電第七八四号(三十六日二十一時附)参照

大使及参事官宛(親展極秘)

末栖氏「首記國務省電」ヲ略述セル文書ヲ
讀了シタル後此等ノ文書ハ日本側ノ提案ニ対ス

ル米國政府ノ回答ナリヤト尋ネタリ、

之ニ對シテ「日本が國內政治情勢ヲ處理セザル

ベカラザルが如ク米國政府モ亦自國ノ國內政治

問題ヲ有テ而シテ「予」カ大使ニ手文セル文書中ニ

記載セル示唆ハ日本ノ提議ニ鑑ミ此際我方

カ爲シ能フ凡テ「モノ」ナリト云ヘリ、

更ニ「予」該文書中ニ實際記述セザリシニ只今

予ガ日本側ニ提示セル提案ハ或ル國際的金

融協定ヲ可能ナラシムルモノナルベト述ベタリ、

末栖氏「彼」カ受領セル文書中ニ示唆セルレ

アル協定「間」種々侮蔑的批評ヲ下セリ而シ

テ彼「我方」カ提案ノ多辺的不侵略條約ニ及

對ノ理由トシテ國際的機構ニツイテ日本が嘗日ノ
タル事キ經驗ヲ説キ且支那が華府條約
ヨリ悪印象ヲ受ケテ之ヲ日本權益無視
ノ上ニ送用セル旨附言セリ。
尚彼ハ「若シ本提案が米國政府ノ真意ヲ
表ハスモノトセバ予ハ如何に協定モ可能性質
ナント思惟ス」
而シテ又予ハ日本政府が支那ヨリ凡ユル陸海
空軍及警察ヲ撤去シ且蔣介石の政權
以外ノ在支政權乃至政府ニ対スル總テノ支援
ヲ撤去スベキ提案ヲ如何ニシテ考慮シ得ベキヤヲ
理解スル能ハスト言ヘリ。(續ク)

次ニ予ガ彼ハ此等問題ノ解決ヲ折衝シ能ハカル
ヤト問ヒタルニ對シ末極氏ハ「日本政府ハ此等ヲ貴提
案ニ同意セザル可ク而シテ該文書ニハ試案ト記サ
レアリ且言質ヲ子フ可キモノニアラザルヲ以テ今後日
本政府ニ送達スル前ニ非公式ニ之ヲ討議スル方
賢策ナラント尅議セリ
予ハ日本側ガ更ニ討議ヲ重スル前ニ該文書ヲ慎重
重検討スルヲ希望スルナラント示唆レ且一般國民ハ前

途ノ見透レヲ失ヒアルニ付我ガ方ノ立場ノ全貌ヲ示ス
コト必要ナリト述べ且石油問題ニ関スル國民ノ切實
ナル關心ヲ説キ而シテ日本ガ民主國ノ大兵力ヲ佛印附
領工内ニ固定シテニミリ米國ニ大ナル危害ヲ子ヘ
ツ、アルコトヲ日本側ニ想ヒ起セシメ且日本ガ佛印ニ軍隊
ヲ流入スルナラバ米國民ハ此等ヲ佛印ノ南方並ニ西方
諸國及直接我ガ方ノ權益ニ對シテ脅威ヲ子コヘレ
トノ、疑念心ヲ抱クヘキコトヲ指摘セリ

末極氏ハ日本ガ汪精衛支持ヲ放棄スルコトノ困難ナルコトニ付一見道理ラレキモ首肯シ難キ論旨ヲ進メ南京政府ノ立場ハ見解ノ問題ナリト言ヘリ

日本側ハソノ提案ニ対スル我ガオノ回答ニ失望ノ色ト日米會談ガ土壇場ニ達セリトノ感ハ情ヲ示セリ
日本側ハ又我ガオガ暫定協約ニ関心ヲ有セザルヤ何等カ他ノ協定可能ナラサルヤ及大統領ト面會レ得ルヤ等ヲ質問シタルニ付予ハ我ガオハ既ニ暫定

協約問題ヲ検討セリト答ヘタル所更ニ我ガオガ暫定協約ヲ考慮スルコトノ不可能ナルハ他國ノ態度ヲ慮カリテノ故ナリヤトノ質問ニ答ヘテ單ニ予ハ既ニ最善ヲ盡シタリト述べアリ尚勿論大統領ハ喜ンテ日本側ト會見スベシト附言セリ(因ニ土月ニ七日本會見ヲ行フコトニ打合せヲナセリ)

國家機密

用済後焼却スヘシ
情報ノ利用ニハ注意ヲ要ス

米特使館外第二二号 第一六二二一
第十八班

日本ノ提案ニ對スル國務省ノ
未答表對案

駐日米大使宛 米國務長官宛
二、二八、一九二〇 答

國務省電第七九六号(三十八日十九日附)
大使及参事官宛(極秘、親展)

十一月二十日、日本側提案ノ受領後國務省ハ日本政府ニ提出セント欲シ、若干ノ代案並ニ對案ヲ其折衷ニ示シテ考慮ヲ與ヘタリ
一時國務省ハ十一月二十六日實際ニ本側ノ手ニ交セル提案ト同時ニ時的對案ニ對スル代案ヲ日本政府ニ提出スルニ對シテ、問題ヲ考慮シタリシガ其際考慮セル案ニ對シテハ三ヶ月間(續ク)

有效ノ一時的暫定協約ヲ定メ其ノ期間内ニ全
太平洋地域ヲ含ム廣汎ナル和平解決ヲ達成
スベキ會談ヲ繼續スルコトヲ提唱シテ
而シテ該暫定協約ノ期間満了ニ方リ兩國
政府ハ何レカ一亦ノ要請ニ依リ布求レアルガ
如キ解決達成ノ見込ニ徴シ該暫定協約ノ
期間延長ノ可否ニ付協議スルモノトナセリ
我ガ方ガ考慮シテ該暫定協約 草案示ス

平和意圖ニ依リ相互折言約東北部亞細亞北
部太平洋地域及東南部亞細亞並南部太平洋
地域内ニ武力進出ヲ爲サレコト相互的保証
日本ハ南部佛印ヨリ其ノ兵カラ撤去シ北部佛印
於ケル兵カラ亦シテ日ニテ六日現在ノ兵數ニ限定シ其
ノ兵數ヲ交替セシメルコトヲハ如何ナル場合
ニ於テモ陸海空軍一（読ク）

ヲ佛印へ増派セザルコトヲ含メリ
 米國政府ハ米國ヨリ日本ニ對シ或條件、
 下ニ船舶用石炭、同供給品、食糧及藥
 品、毎月價格六十万弗マテ、棉花、目下許可
 セラレアル種類以内ニ於ケル石油、少量一月ヲ基礎
 トスル米國ヨリ一般民用輸出ハ英蘭兩國政
 府ト協議、上其割宛量ヲ決定スルコトノ輸
 出ヲ許ス程度ニ於テ其凍結令ヲ修正スベシ

米國ハ生絲ノ價格ガ輸入品價格ノ少ナクトモ三分
 ノ三ニ達スルコトヲ條件トシテ一般輸出ヲ許可
 スベシ
 斯ナル輸入ヨリ生スル利益ハ吾國ヨリ輸出
 品ノ購入及米國內ニ於テ日本負債ノ元利支拂
 用ニ宛ルベシ
 米國政府ハ英蘭濠三國政府ニ對シ類
 似ノ經濟的措置ヲ執

(續ク)

極秘

一、用済後焼却スヘシ
二、本情報ノ利用ニハ注意ヲ要ス

至急

國家機密

第三三號

昭二六、一三、一
廿八日

十月二十日日本側提案ノ内容

駐支米大使宛

米國務長官宛
一、二、九、一七、三五受

國務省電第ニ七七号(三十八日十五時附)

大使宛(極秘親展)

十月二十日日本側ハ五項ヨリ成ル時的協定案

ヲ提出セルガ其ノ内容次ノ如シ

一、米國ハ支那ノ、ヲ回復セントスル日本ノ盡

力ヲ害スル行爲ヲ中止スルコト

二、日米兩國ハ凍結制限ヲ撤廢シ且通商関

係ヲ復旧スルコト

米國ハ、及所要石油ヲ、スルコト

三、兩國ハ、ヨリ世西ナル物次具ヲ得ルコトニ協

カスルコト

四、兩國ハ日本ガ占據シタル佛領印度ヲ除キ東

至急 南部亞細亞地域及南太平洋地域内ノ何等

極秘

一、用済後焼却スヘシ
二、本情報ノ利用ニハ注意ヲ要ス

ル如ク斡旋スヘシ

我が方ノ暫定協約案ノ或點ニツイテハ華
府駐劄英、蘭、濠、支西國代表ノ意
見ヲ求メタリ

米國內ノ情勢及前記各政府ノ反響並ニ
回答ヲ含ム一般的世界情勢ニ於ケル凡
ル要素ヲ慎重考慮ノ後我が方が考慮シ
タル該暫定協約案ヲ放棄スルコトニ決

定セリ

該暫定協約案ハ日本側ヘキ交セザリキ而
シテ本政府ガ一、暫定協約案ヲ考慮セル
コトノ事實本側ヘ通告セザリキ也

國務省ハ十月二十六日日本大使ヘキ交セル文
書並ニ同日行ハレタル會談ノ内容ハ別電
ヲ以テ貴使ヘ通報セリ爲念

武力進出ヲ爲サルコト

五日本ハ日支和平解決又ハ太平洋地区ニ於

ケル恒久的和平建設後佛印ヨリ撤兵スル

コト 然レテ日本ハ本取極々締結ト共ニ

南部佛印ヨリ北部佛印ニ撤兵レ此取極

々ハ後日恒久的取極々一部トセラルベシ

二

極秘

一、用済後焼却スヘシ
二、本情報ノ利用ニハ注意ヲ要ス

至急

米特使館外第24号

一六二二班
第十八班

國家機密

日米會談對スル支那側ノ態度

駐支米大使宛

國務長官 祭

二、二九一七三五受

國務省電第277号(續キ)(三十八日十五時附)

大使宛(極秘親展)

十一月二十日支那大使自ラ求メテ國務長官
ヲ來訪シテ我方ガ考慮シツ、アリシ暫定協定案
ニ関シ蔣介石ガ種々ノ経路ヲ通ジテ各方面ニ
宛テタル電報ノ内ニ表明セル態度ヲ豫メ

詳細説明セシコトヲ求メタリ

大使ハ支那外交部長ヨリノ電報ノ寫シヲ

國務長官ニ手交セルガ其内容ハ

「蔣介石ハ米政府ガ支那問題ヲ放棄
スルノミナラズ、支那ヲ犠牲ニシテ日本ノ歡
心ヲ求メントスルノ傾向アリト云ヘリト述ヘ
尚外交部長、蔣委員長ニ對シ米國
務長官ガ常ニ基礎(續ク)

的原則ヲ極メテ尊重シアルハ明カナルコト
國務長官ノ暫定協定ノ可能性ニ因リテ
ノ照會ニ依リ曰本側ハ未ダ何事モ通
ゼザルコト明瞭ナルコトヲ告ゲタリト述べ更
ニ進ンデ支那ガ其ノ國難ヲ惹起シ或ハ曰
本ノ侵略力強化ヲ招来スルガ如キ如何ナ
ル措置ニモ強硬反對ナル旨ヲ主張セリト
云フニ在リ

國務長官ハ支那大使ニ對シ曰本側トノ會
談ニ於テハ全太平洋ニ因リテ廣汎圍ノ和平
解決ヲ探究シ或程度進捗シアルコト及曰本
側ハ此ノ目的ノ爲此種會談ノ繼續セラレン
コトヲ要望シアルト告ゲタリ
予ハ……氏及蔣介石ガ最近滇緬公路ニ
因シ……ニ多クノ強硬ナル長文電報ヲ送
付シテ援助ヲ懇ヘタル旨ヲ指摘シ余並大統
領ガ考慮中ノ暫定協約案ノ主要ナル

點ノ一ハ蔣が指摘セシ如キ滇緬公路ニ對
スル意眉ノ危険ヲ防止スルニ在リトシヘリ

予(國務長官)ハ蔣が明カニ協約安ホニ就中

ハ救助スベキコトヲ看過セルコトヲ述ベ

タリ
予
ハ米國ノ軍主脳部ノ意見ニ依

レバ日本が該暫定協約安ホノ九十日間ノ期

間内ニ於テ入午ニ得ル石油製品ノ限ラレタル

量ハ日本ノ軍事的準備ノ増大セザルコト明瞭

テル旨ヲ指摘セリ

(以下國務省電第七九六號末尾ニ同じ)

外機密

- 2 -

and material Macao (? increase ?) in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indo-China.

"It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement — and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement—...

(? between) Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indo-China was very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already there.

"The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya; or, either through coercion or through the actual use of force, for the purpose of undertaking the

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

142

外機密

A -
G

5/12/41

S

Roosevelt's Inquiry on Japan's Policy

(In double cipher)

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

December 3rd, 2.35 a.m., 1941

Summary:

The text of a memorandum from Roosevelt to Hull and Welles directing the latter to request Nomura and Kurusu inquire of their home Government what is the significance of the Japanese military concentration in Southern Indo-China.

No. 804, December 2nd, 7 p.m.

Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and Counsellor only.

There is quoted for your information the text of a memorandum to the Secretary and Under-Secretary from the President, communicated on December 2nd to the Japanese Ambassador as follows:

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to Southern Indo-China. These reports indicate a very rapid

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

141

外機密

- 4 -

intention of the Japanese Government."

Hull.

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

144

外機密

- 3 -

occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the driven (? downright ?) aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government. Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated under (? by the) recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indo-China. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government, which has ... (? constituted ?) a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defence that I should like to know the

本情報ハ御一覽後電信課長宛必親展トシテ御再回乞フ

外務省

143

大臣

極秘

一、用済後焼却スヘシ
二、本情報ノ利用ニハ注意ヲ要ス

次官

至急

栗利加

米特暗号外第五號

一六、一三、一六
第十八班

米大統領ハ日米會談ニ関シ國務長官
及國務次官ニ對シ覺書ヲ交付ス

駐日米大使宛

米國務長官祭

一、三、三〇、三三五 祭

國務省電第八〇四号(二月十九時附)

大使及参事館宛(極秘親展)

御参考ノ爲 大統領ハ國務長官並國務

次官ニ其ヘテ日本大使ニ通告セシメタル覺書

ノ本文ヲ通報ス

予ハ過日末日本軍が引續キ佛印南

部へ移動シアリトノ報道ニ接セルガ此等ノ報道

ニ依リ佛印駐屯ノ日本各種部隊ノ兵力ハ

極メテ迅速且ツ豊富ニ増強セラレアルモノ

如シ

予が明瞭ニ了解スル所ニ依リ日佛協

定(目下之カ可否ヲ論スルハ要ナシ)ハ

極秘

一、用済後焼却スヘシ
二、本情報ノ利用ニハ注意ヲ要ス

日本及「サイシー」佛國政府ニ對シ該協定ノ
條項ニ依リ佛印内ニ駐屯セシムラルベキ日本
軍ノ總數ハ既ニ同地ニ駐屯シタル總數ヨ
リモ著シク減少スベキコトヲ勸告スルモノナル
カ佛印ニ於ケル此等増加兵力ノ駐屯ハ
該地ノ治安維持ノ爲ニハ斯カル尤大ナル
兵力必要ナキガ故ニ日本が更ニ侵略ノ目
的ヲ以テ此等兵力ヲ利用セントスルヲ意味シ

アルモノノ如ク

唯フニ斯カル侵略ハ比島、東印度諸島、緬
甸、馬來半島ニ對シ行ハルベク又威壓乃至
實力ノ使用ニ依リ泰國占領ヲ目的トスルモ
ノナルベシ

斯ノ如ク新ナル侵略ハ勿論既ニ行ハレタル對
支侵略行爲ノ延長ナルガ之ニ對スル我方ノ
態度ハ周知ノ事實ニシテ繰返シ日本政府ニ

極秘

一、用済後焼却スヘシ
二、本情報ノ利用ニハ注意ヲ要ス

言明セル所ナリ

就テハ野村、来栖両大使ニ對シ即時日本政府
府ハ既ニ執ラレタル措置ニ對スル眞實ノ理由及
前述ノ如ク最近且急速ニ佛印内ニ軍隊ヲ
集結セル日本政府ノ方策ヲ如何ニ解スベキ
ヤニ付照會方ヲ要請アリ度

米國政府ハ過去數年間歐洲ニ於テ独逸
カ同じ性質ノ軍事措置ヲ利用シテ自由獨立

諸國家ノ領土並ニ權利ヲ絶ヘズ確實ニ懸
食セル政策ヲ實見セリ

予ハ右ノ理由並ニ廣汎ナル米國國防問題
ノ爲日本政府ノ意圖ヲ知ラント欲ス

△147